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Abstract
This paper develops a method to examine data on fresh produce imports from Latin America and
the Caribbean into the United States from 1993-1999 to determine:  1) if there are significant
differences in frequency of interceptions for a specific product for the region or a specific
country within the region, and 2) whether significant changes in trade flows for specific products
have occurred between points of origin and ports of entry.  The results show that there are indeed
differences between countries with respect to interception frequency, however current data on
the fumigation frequency for a commodity/country or commodity/port of entry is not sufficient
to determine the causes that underlie differences in frequencies between countries.
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The Significance of Interceptions of Fresh Produce from Latin America and the Caribbean
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 William E. Kost
I.  Introduction
Recent agreements to liberalize trade have resulted in tariff reductions, the conversion of
quotas to tariffs, and a re-orientation of agricultural policies in many countries.  While barriers to
trade have declined and become more transparent, protection of domestic industries (particularly
in the agricultural sector) is being accomplished through use of less visible restrictions.  Kroehle
and Weinberger (1994) suggest that there are two reasons for use of such restrictions.  First,
embargoes and quotas that have worked in the past as de facto disease controls will no longer be
allowed under WTO.  Second, it is highly likely that many countries will increasingly turn
towards standards and regulations to impede the free flow of trade and thus protect their
agricultural sectors as tariffs, subsidies, and quantitative restrictions are phased out.  Measures to
realise these policy goals include regulations governing health, safety and environmental
characteristics of products, product content, and product labelling.  On the other hand, some
countries have used programs such as preclearance and on-site inspection to smooth the flow of
trade.  Due to limited available data, little empirical work has been done to access implications of
these institutional measures on trade.
Favorable climate, land and water resources, low labor costs and complementary growing
seasons in Latin America and the Caribbean have resulted in a significant increase in exports,
including new or non-traditional products, from these countries to markets world-wide (Thrupp,
1995).  Currently North America is the biggest market for fresh fruit from Latin America and the
Caribbean (Unnevehr, 1999).  The trade between these regions is expected to grow further as2
barriers to trade decline. However, for many less developed countries, the major difficulty in
taking advantage of liberalized trade is penetrating the United States market and its quarantine
system.
Further advances in transportation and storage technologies, in tandem with the
eradication of plant and animal diseases have reduced the time and difficulty associated with
moving food products long distances and have enabled many countries to access markets that
have not been reachable traditionally.  This process may or may not increase competition with
domestic producers.  For example, if entry occurs in a season when the product was not formerly
available consumer demand, even for domestic products, may be strengthened by having it
available for a longer time period.  Alternatively, this phenomenon may lead to either domestic
producers or the government investing in foreign production capacity or cooperating through
market alliances to assure greater product presence throughout the year (Haley 1997).
It has been suggested by many researchers (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998; Hillman, 1991;
Orden and Roberts, 1997; Thilmany and Barrett, 1997; and others) that despite this increased
access to the market, the ability of less developed countries to gain from the newly liberalised
trade environment depends largely on its capacity to overcome the remaining non-tariff trade
barriers that have been established for quality, packaging, and labelling of products.  Increasingly
exporters are complaining that in times of domestic shortages United States customs ease
enforcement of importation regulations on products and in times of high domestic production
increase the requirements on the importation of products.  It has been suggested that customs
agents discourage entry of goods by inconvenient inspection scheduling, by varying
interpretations of the inspection requirements, and by delaying or expediting the handling,3
shipping, and processing of documents.  It is difficult and costly to prove such allegations,
however.
This research analyzes a set of data on fresh produce imports into the United States from
1993-1999 to quantify those actions that have been used to circumvent SPS measures (e.g.
changes in interception rates at the port of entry). An index is developed to measure the relative
differences in interception frequencies.  Statistical tests are used to examine the significance of
differences between countries and ports of entry for a set of products.
II. Excluding Foreign Pests and Diseases
One way to prevent the spread of disease is to prevent infected products from coming
into a country.  The rationale behind this is that pests and disease invasions decrease the quantity
and quality of crop and livestock production and increase the costs of agricultural products for
both the producer and consumer.  To implement this policy, personnel are placed at various
strategic border-crossing points to inspect imported products for specific foreign pests and
diseases that may affect domestic plant and animal production.  Due to the airborne nature of
many diseases and pests, it is difficult to prevent their entry from countries sharing borders with
dissimilar pest and disease status.  Arguments exist that countries with similar disease status as
the United States for a specific product are excluded from exporting products to the United
States (e.g., Karnal bunt).
In the United States, the agency responsible for protecting plant health (the Animal and
Plant Health Inspection Service (APHIS)), a unit of the U. S. Department of Agriculture has
established regulations governing the importation of products that may contain plant disease and
pests.  Rules have been established to monitor the flow of plant and animal products.4
Import Permits and Phytosanitary Certificates:  Currently, import permits and phytosanitary
certificates are required for many plants and plant products for entry into the United States.
These certificates verify that quarantine officials of the exporting country have examined the
commodities for pests and diseases prior to the commodities’ departure from the country.  Thus
pests are not introduced into U. S. agriculture.  Because of the current lack of acceptable
quarantine treatments proven to destroy pests and diseases of concern, not all plants and plant
products are allowed to be imported into the United States.
Foreign Preclearance Programs:  Preclearance programs also exist within a foreign country.
They enable the inspection and treatment of items onsite to prevent harmful exotic pests and
disease from entering the United States.  These preclearance programs are essentially
partnerships between foreign businesses and APHIS, whereby APHIS stations officers in foreign
countries to inspect and clear goods prior to their being shipped to the United States.  All costs
for operating preclearance programs are paid for by exporters through trust fund agreements that
APHIS establishes in each participating country.  Table 1 lists the currently established
preclearance programs administered by the United States.  For the Latin American and
Caribbean countries and for the commodities studied there are few preclearance programs
established.
A foreign preclearance system enables the inspection and treatment of products onsite in
exporting countries prior to adding transaction costs in situations where the end result may mean
no entry or entry at a loss.  These products are also spot checked at the various ports of entry
within the United States to verify compliance.  The benefits to the exporters include the ability of
immediate in-country replacement of products, which do not pass inspections, thus eliminating
loss of commodity or the need for costly fumigation in the United States.  In addition, all other5
costs associated with loss of commodity value due to rejection at port of entry (i.e., container
costs, actual shipping costs, brokerage fees, etc.) are eliminated.
An additional benefit from the standpoint of the importing country is that it prevents
exotic pests and diseases from getting into a country at the port of entry.  Preclearance programs
decrease the number of port-of-entry personnel needed in the United States.  This reduces
activities at congested ports enabling products to get through the port of entry in a more
expedited manner.  Taxpayers benefits from this because all costs associated with preclearance,
including salaries, benefits, travel, and per diem of the inspectors are paid by the foreign co-
operators in country.
Inspection at Port of Entry:  All agricultural products that have not been admitted through
preclearance programs are checked at the port of entry
1 for quarantine-significant pest and
disease.  If the product is free of exotic pests and plant diseases that are not harmful to current
plant production in the United States it is released into the market.  If an actionable pest is found,
the shipment is either refused entry, surrendered for destruction, or allowed in with some form of
treatment.
When a product is re-exported it either goes back to the market of origin or to another
country which does not have the same concern over the presence of a particular pest.  Many
products re-exported at the U.S,. port of entry often go to Canada, which does not have the
climate to grow many of the products for which there is a concern of potential infection and has
cold winters which kill off many of the offending pests.
Though surrender for destruction is an option, port of entry officials suggest that this is
rarely done given the costs involved (i.e., an inspector needs to accompany the product
                                               
1 APHIS maintains 16 plant inspection stations, the largest of which is at Miami, FL, for commercial importation of
plant materials.6
throughout the whole destruction process) (Narrod, 1997).  Thus it is often considerably cheaper
to destroy the product through one of the treatment process, such as fumigation.  This situation
often occurs in places where fumigation takes place under hot conditions on tarmac.  The
differences in temperatures in the cooling process results in the sweating of the product, which at
times ruins its market potential.  If fumigation were to take place under controlled cold
temperatures the shelf life of the product would be maintained.
Historically the most common treatment of fresh products has been fumigation with
methyl bromide.
2  In some ports of entry there are a limited number of fumigators.  This leads to
a near-monopoly situation which can result in high charges and may create bottlenecks at
fumigation sites.  In addition, there is a cost associated with the treatment.  The Foreign
Agricultural Service (1996) reports that cold treatments currently costs about 0.20 dollars per
kilo and lengthen the export period twelve to fourteen days.  The reduction in shelf life of the
product after fumigation and the need to reduce its price below market value so that some return
will be realized on the product before it rots make this process extremely costly to the shipper.
III. Previous Studies
Non-technical barriers:  The use of sanitary and phytosanitary regulations has been growing
since the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS
Agreement) was reached.  This agreement, which was a part of the final act of GATT, included a
series of understandings as to how SPS measures would be established, adopted, and enforced by
individual countries.  The key provisions of the agreement are:  1) the use of scientifically-based
measures (i.e., risk assessment); 2) the recognition of pest- and disease-free areas and areas of
                                               
2 Because it is considered to be a contributor to stratospheric ozone depletion, methyl bromide in the United States is to
be phased out in 2001 with a longer phase out period (2011) for developing countries.7
low pest or disease prevalence and allowing trade from those regions; 3) participation in the
international standards setting organizations and, wherever possible, basing import requirements
on international standards; 4) recognizing equivalent treatments and quarantine practices to
facilitate trade; and 5) a dispute settlement process which begins with technical consultations and
proceeds, if necessary, to a formal dispute settlement system (Hillman 1991).
Many countries are increasingly concerned that as tariffs are negotiated away, there is
enormous potential for, and perhaps widespread misuse of, technical measures as non-
transparent obstacles to trade, even when the broad desirability of lowering risks to health and
safety is acknowledged and despite the new (and as yet untested) international rules (Orden and
Roberts 1997).  Roberts and DeReemer (1997) suggest that this concern is not unjust.  For
instance, USDA has estimated that approximately $434 million U.S. dollars of United States
export market share to Latin America (Central and South America) is currently threatened or
denied because of questionable plant health requirements.  Also a smaller amount ($12 million) of
U.S. exports is either threatened or denied because of animal health concerns, and a larger amount
($843 million) due to food safety barriers (Roberts and DeRemer 1997).  Other countries also face
similar concerns.
Few studies have looked at the cost of non-technical barriers (Calvin and Krissoff, 1998;
Orden and Roberts, 1997; and others).  Roberts and DeRemer (1997) were among the few who
tried to quantify the existence of such barriers, but they found it necessary to rely on expert
opinion to quantify the magnitude of such barriers.
Interceptions:  Since the mid 1990’s several studies have examined empirical data to
determine the implications of liberalized trade between countries with different regulatory
environments and to assess the willingness of countries to accept products from countries with8
unknown health conditions or where there was thought to be a lack of credible certificates.
These studies looked specifically at interception data on products coming into the United States.
Currently three databases in the United States exist containing this information.  The Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) inspects and collects information all food products coming into the
United States except meat and poultry products that may affect human health.  APHIS collects
information on all products coming into the United States that may affect plant or animal health.
The Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS) inspects and collects information on all animal
products coming into the United States that may affect human health.
Thiermann and Greifer (1995) were the first to analyze APHIS data enumerating
phytosanitary certificates issued and interceptions of reportable pests between 1991 and 1994.
They concluded that while the data required further analysis, it did not suggest that there was any
apparent evidence to indicate that either pest interceptions or seizures of illegal plant and animal
material increased during the first year of NAFTA.
Thrupp (1995) looked at FDA pesticide detention data.  She associated the increased
pesticide detentions in part with the increased concern during the 1980s over the health impact of
pesticide residues on foods.  At this time the U.S. FDA increased its monitoring of food imports.
Subsequently, FAO (1999) and Unnevehr (1999) used FDA’s data to look specifically at
developing countries.  They found that the largest number of detentions were associated with
vegetables followed by fish and seafood, then fruits and fruit products. Wang and Caswell (1998)
and Caswell and Wang (2000) used this same database to look at United States - Asian countries
trade.  In their analysis, high rates of detention from products originating in Asia were attributed
to the absence of sufficient standards and ineffective government inspection.  Further, they
suggested that meeting food regulations was a significant barrier to Asian food products entering9
the United States, especially for products originating in developing and newly industrialized
countries.  Donovan (2000) thesis looked at the seafood industry in Brazil, and reached similar
conclusions.
With the exception of Thierman and Griefer (1995), none of these studies tested whether
any country had a statistically worse problem than any other country or cataloged the effect of
detention over time on trade patterns.
IV. Border Inspection Data and Analysis
This study uses data from USDA/APHIS PQ280 database to assess variations in
interceptions and trade patterns between countries in Latin American and the Caribbean to the
United States.  The PQ280 database contains month-by-month records of shipments of plant
products, including fruits and vegetables, entering the United States.  Each record consists of the
commodity, country of origin, port of entry, number of shipments, quantity of product, and
disposition.  These data cover October 1993 to September 1998.  The annual total fruit and
vegetable fumigations experienced by Latin American countries are shown in Table 2.  Not
surprisingly, major exporters from the region to the United States (e.g., Mexico, Chile, Costa
Rica) have much higher quantities of product fumigated than smaller exporters.  Two statistical
tests are conducted on these data.  The first test relates to relative rates of fumigation between
countries.  The second test explores differences between ports of entry.
We first test, the likelihood that the probability of fumigation of a shipment differs
between countries.  To measure this likelihood, a simple statistical model is constructed to make
inferences about the relative proportions of fumigation frequency.  We compare the fumigation
frequency of each importing country to the aggregate fumigation frequency of the remainder of10
the countries.  The latter aggregate fumigation frequency is termed the complimentary frequency.
The complimentary frequency represents the fumigation frequency that would be observed if one
country did not export the given commodity to the United States.  We thus seek to test if the
observed fumigations experienced by one country differs from that of the remainder of countries
that export the same commodity.  To eliminate biases introduced due to seasonality and
minimize the effects of outliers, the fumigation and total quantities are summed over the entire
period covered by the data.
Let 
c
j F  be the number of shipments of commodity c requiring fumigation for a given
country j and let 
c
j T  be the total number of shipments of commodity c for a given country j.
There are N countries that export commodity c to the United States.  The equivalence of the
proportion of commodities requiring fumigation between a specific country and all other
























The volume of imports for a country is therefore a factor in determining significance.  A
two-sided t-test is used to evaluate this hypothesis.  The following seven commodities products
were examined to test this first hypothesis: grape, cantaloupe, plantain, cassava, yam, ginger, and
lemon.  Each of these commodities ranks among the top 50 fresh produce imports from Latin
America and in the top 20 among commodities requiring fumigation.  This set of commodities
cover situations where there are many exporting countries, rather than only one or two countries.
Figures 1 through 7 show the percentages of product requiring fumigation for the seven
commodities.  Figure 1 represents grape imports although Argentina, Brazil and Chile all have11
high rates of fumigations, only Chile is significantly above the complimentary frequency. For
Argentina, its fumigation rate of 14% is significantly lower than the 55% complimentary
frequency.  For the case of cantaloupe and plantain imports, the fumigation percentages visibly
greater than zero correspond to the frequencies significantly above average.  For cassava, only
Costa Rica and Guatemala are significantly above their complimentary frequencies.  Yams are a
heavily fumigated product, with near zero fumigation rates being experienced only for countries
that export only a small quantity.  Brazil experienced historical fumigations for 86% of its yam
exports, but this is still significantly less than the complimentary frequency of 91%.  For ginger,
all the top exporters have higher relative fumigation rates, with the exception of Brazil, whereas
only Chile has a significantly higher fumigation rate than other countries for lemons. Brazil, the
other major lemon importer, had no fumigations over the data period.  The results are
summarized in Table 3, which shows which countries are significantly above, significantly
below, and not statistically different from the adjusted frequencies for each commodity
examined.
The second test examines the differences in fumigation frequency between ports of entry.
For this case, we are interested in examining the relative rates of fumigation for a single product
that enters through many ports.  To control for differences between sources of the commodities,
we selected a commodity that has only one principal source in Latin America: Nectarines from
Chile.  The hypothesis can be formally stated in a manner similar to the first, with country index

























Figure 8 shows the percentage of fumigations for nectarines introduced at 10 United
States ports of entry. Both Long Beach and Philadelphia have significantly higher rates than the
other ports.  These two locations represent two-thirds of all imports.  Wilmington, which
represents about 25%, carries out significantly less fumigations than the other two ports.  An
interesting further analysis would be to investigate whether changes in favored ports occurred
over time as a result of perceived enforcement differences.  Table 4 shows the differences in
complimentary frequencies  by port for nectarines from Chile.
VI. Discussion
Interception data show that for some commodity/country and some commodity/port-of-
entry the frequency of interceptions is significantly higher than average.  Moreover, some
countries seem to be more prone to intervention and fumigation than others.  However, these
data can only measure whether statistically significant differences exist with respect to
interventions and fumigation frequencies.  Alone, these data can say little about the causal
mechanisms that create such differences.  Further data, even anecdotal, is necessary to associate
fumigation events with originating country behaviors.  To fully understand producer’s export
strategy and market implications, the interception data should be integrated with data on market
prices and production costs and production practices.13
Table 1: Established Horticultural Preclearance Programs with the United States
Country Commodities
Argentina Apples & pears
Australia Apples, nashi pears, pears, grapes
Belgium Bulb inspection
Brazil Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Chile Stonefruit, berries, grapes, cut flowers, cherimoya, kiwifruit, other fruits & vegetables
Colombia Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Costa Rica Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Ecuador Mangoes (hot water treatment) & melons (free zone)
France Apples
Great Britain Bulb inspection
Guatemala Mangoes (hot water treatment) & melons
Haiti Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Ireland Bulb inspection
Israel Bulb inspection
Jamaica Ugli fruit, cut flowers, papaya & 46 other commodities
Japan Sand pears, Unshu oranges, Fuji apples
Korea Sand pears, mandarin oranges
Mexico Mangoes (hot water treatment), citrus(fumigation or from Sonora free zone), apples, apricots,
peaches, persimmons, & pomegranates (Sonora free zone)
New Zealand Apples, pears, Nashi pears
Netherlands Bulb inspection
Nicaragua Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Peru Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Scotland Bulb inspection
South Africa Apples, pears, plums, grapes, peaches, nectarines, & citrus
Spain Lemons, clementines, Valencia oranges
Taiwan Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Turkey Bulb inspection
Venezuela Mangoes (hot water treatment)
Source:  APHIS website, 200014
Table 2: Annual fumigations by country (kgs)
(data for 1993 and 1998 partial)
Country 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
ARGENTINA 41100 53732 275289
BAHAMAS 31909 5840793 4163382 1548559 51360
BARBADOS 1800 131
BELIZE 620 44702 8239 4257
BRAZIL 94092 214577 210976 180686 546620 61554
CHILE 7550686 173190103 357515385 261553369 264252291 277300746
COLOMBIA 1699148 3655300 3483146 3871596 825935 755376
COSTA RICA 1152902 12430701 37200088 26664771 54924366 59501874
DOMINICA 20 DOMINICAN 
REPUBLIC 64404 297705 580600 521943 133596 728741
ECUADOR 35969081 1903254 1044080 633750 864117 85277
EL SALVADOR 252030 14681 1005667 1719949
GRENADA 750 2227 1467 150
GUATEMALA 732838 2682622 3035414 17922456 45172395
GUYANA 4 822 56 241 375
HAITI 408 267326 81188
HONDURAS 180101 2155774 595279 3122928 3372245
JAMAICA 754402 3301062 17833670 3926675 1606734 640797
MEXICO 5770854 41935140 9859620 17918323 5021169
NICARAGUA 449573 245150 258000 136360
PANAMA 20412 990345 3476239 642422 442780 174106
PERU 31183 19023 183192 1999494 46940
ST. LUCIA 650 868 4132 968 300
ST. VINCENT 458
SURINAME 24100
TRINIDAD 10318 184063 48680 2453 2507
URUGUAY 87630





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 8: Fumigation percentages by port, nectarine imports19
Commodity
Above complimentary 




Argentina, Brazil, Dom. Rep., Mexico, 
Panama, Peru, Venezuela
Cantaloupe
Costa Rica, Dom. Rep., 
Guatemala, Honduras, 
Nicaragua, Panama
Bahamas, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, 




Argentina, Belize, Costa 
Rica, Ecuador, Panama, 
Venezuela
Antigua, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Dominic, Dom. Rep., El Salvador, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Peru, St. Vincent
Anguilla, St. Kitts
Cassava Costa Rica, Guatemala
Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Dominica, 
Dom. Rep., Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, Venezuela
Guyana, Trinidad
Yam
Bahamas, Belize, Chile, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, 
Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, 
Panama, Venezuela
Anguilla, Brazil, Dominica, Dom. 
Rep., Ecuador, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Peru, St. Kitts, St. Vincent, Trinidad
Ginger




Argentina Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, 
Colombia, Dominica, Dom. Rep., 
Grenada, Jamaica, Mexico, Panama, 





Argentina, Bahamas, Brazil, 
Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, 
Dom. Rep., Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, 
Trinidad, Uruguay, Venezuela











Dallas, JFK, Los 
Angeles, Miami, 
New Orleans, San 
Juan, Wilmington
Table 4: Difference from complimentary frequencies by port, nectarines from Chile
(a a=0.05)20
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